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A Proposed Solution to the Federal
Taxation of Alaska Permanent Fund
Dividend Payments*
This note addresses the federal taxation of payments made to
Alaska residents under the Permanent Fund Dividend Program.
It argues that the State must develop a method of distributing
Permanent Fund revenue that will not result in federal taxation of
the payments. The note proposes that the dividend program be
restructured to provide residents with rebates for fossil fuel
expenditures and reimbursements for tuition expenses. Such
payments are arguably non-taxable and would further the initial
purposes of the dividend program.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since their inception, annual payments to Alaska residents
under the Alaska Permanent Fund ("the Fund") have been treated
as taxable income.' Such treatment has been affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit and the United States Tax Court.2 Consequently,
while the Fund distributes nearly $500 million in annual dividends,3
Alaskans retain only part of this amount. Approximately twenty
percent, or $100 million, is lost to federal income taxation each
year,4 a fiscally unsound result for a state running a multi-million
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1. See infra text accompanying notes 28-35.
2. Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988); Merrill v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 558 (1989)
(dismissing taxpayer's challenge to a deficiency levied for failing to report
Permanent Fund dividend as taxable income).
3. See ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 8. On
October 1, 1992, the Commissioner of Revenue announced that the dividend
distribution for the 1993 fiscal year exceeded $473 million, with over 517,000
Alaskans qualifying. See id. On June 30, 1993, $532 million was set aside for the
fiscal 1994 dividend distribution. Id. at 23.
4. GUNNAR KNAPP ET AL., INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND PROGRAM: ECONOMIC
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dollar deficit.'
To maintain fiscal stability, the state legislature must find a
way to bring the benefit of the Permanent Fund to all Alaskans
without income tax liability. One obvious solution is to redirect the
disbursements to government agencies and away from individual
Alaskans. Such a proposal, however, would be politically infeasi-
ble, as Alaskans have begun to view their individualized disburse-
ments as annual entitlements. The challenge facing the legislature,
therefore, is to restructure the dividend program to avoid income
tax liability while retaining broad-based, individualized annual
distributions.
This note provides a potential solution to this problem, arguing
that the Permanent Fund disbursements can be restructured as
rebates for personal fuel expenditures. In this form, dividend
payments may be excludable from gross income under the tax
benefit rule. One large group left out of such a program, however,
would be minors, who probably would not maintain the requisite
level of fossil fuel expenditures to qualify. To alleviate this
potential problem, minors could receive non-taxable disbursements
in the form of scholarship payments or reimbursements for tuition
expenses, which are not includable in gross income. Together,
these two disbursement programs would offset both increasing fuel
costs (one of the stated purposes of the dividend program) and
increasing tuition costs--costs shared by nearly all Alaskans.
The origins and current status of the Permanent Fund are
discussed in part II of this note. Part III addresses the legal
background of the federal taxation of Permanent Fund dividend
EFFECTS AND PUBLIC ATrrrTDEs 5 (1984). Knapp et al. derived the 20% figure
from statistics available for the 1982 disbursement. Id. This figure has remained
constant. For instance, in 1990 Alaskans' paid, on average, 18% of their adjusted
gross income ("AGI") to the federal government. See ALMANAC OF THE 50
STATES, BASIC DATA PROFILES WITH COMPARATIVE TABLES 16 (Edith R.
Hornor ed., 1993). This statistic was derived as follows: In 1990, Alaskans filed
313,610 federal income tax returns, showing an aggregate AGI of $9,008,782,000,
or $28,730 per return. 1d. On average, $5030, or 18% of AGI, was paid in federal
taxes. Id.
5. Scott Goldsmith, Safe Landing: A Fiscal Strategy for the 1990s, 7 INSTITUTE
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH FISCAL POLICY PAPERS 1 (1992). Alaska
is facing a fiscal crisis, as oil revenues have been declining steadily at a rate of
11% since 1988. Oil revenue comprises 85% of Alaska's general revenue and
creates 30% of Alaskans' personal income. Id. The 1992 budget shortfall was
$600 million, which the State covered, in part, by drawing upon reserve funds. Id.
at 16. By restructuring the dividend program so that disbursements do not incur
federal taxation, however, the State can reduce the amount of annual payments
without substantially decreasing the net amount received by Alaskans, thereby
freeing funds for State programs. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
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payments, including the Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS")
position, the reasoning behind the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Greisen v. United States' and an analysis of the dividend payments
under contemporary tax doctrine. Part IV discusses possible
solutions to the taxation of Permanent Fund dividend payments,
concluding that the Fund should be restructured as a rebate
program for personal expenditures on fossil fuel products.
II. THE ORIGIN AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE ALASKA
PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND PROGRAM
After the discovery and development of oil on Alaska's North
Slope, the State received revenues far in excess of amounts needed
for ordinary governmental functions. In response, Alaska estab-
fished the Permanent Fund in 1976. Alaska then made a constitu-
tional dedication to the Fund of at least twenty-five percent of all
mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal
mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses.' Subsequent
legislation increased the applicable ?ercentage to fifty percent for
certain types of oil and gas receipts.
As the Fund grew, Alaskans demanded that some of the
wealth be returned to the citizenry through tax repeal and cash
distributions.9 In 1980, the legislature responded by distributing
one-half of the earnings of the Fund annually to state residents in
the form of dividend payments." Three purposes underlaid the
1980 Act:
(1) to provide a mechanism for equitable distribution to the
people of Alaska of at least a portion of the state's energy
wealth derived from the development and production of the
natural resources belonging to them as Alaskans;(2) to encourage persons to maintain their residence in Alaska
and to reduce population turnover in the state; and
(3) to encourage increased awareness and involvement by the
residents of the state in the management and expenditure of the
Alaska permanent fund."
6. 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
7. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15.
8. See Beattie v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 481, 482 (D. Alaska 1986), affd
sub noma. Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988). In addition, the legislature has made two special appropriations
of surplus revenues to the Permanent Fund. The first, in 1981, was for $900
million; the second was for $1.8 billion in 1982. Id.
9. See generally Clifford J. Groh and Gregg Erikson, The Permanent Fund
Dividend Program: Alaska's "Noble Experiment," ALASKA J., Summer 1983, at
141.
10. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 2, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 2.
11. Id. § 1(b).
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The legislature made additional statutory findings that such a
program supported the public interest by distributing a portion of
Alaska's energy wealth to its citizens 2 and by providing a buffer
for citizens against rising fuel costs.'3
Under the 1980 legislation, the amount a resident received was
tied to the duration of his or her residency in Alaska, with each
resident eighteen years or older receiving fifty dollars for each year
of residency since 1959, the year of statehood. 4 This provision
was challenged by two relatively new residents of Alaska, who
argued that it violated their rights of interstate travel and equal
protection. In Zobel v. Williams,5 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the 1980 Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 6
Before this decision was announced, the Alaska legislature had
amended the 1980 Act, providing for the immediate replacement
of any terms deemed unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court. 7 This legislation became operative shortly after
the Zobel decision and directed that equal payments be distributed
to all eligible residents, including minors, provided they intended
to remain permanently in the state. 8 In 1982, the first dividend
checks of $1000 per resident were distributed, totaling approximate-
ly $458 million. Eighty-eight million dollars was collected in federal
income tax on these dividends. 9
Since 1982, the Permanent Fund has grown from about $3
billion to over $15 billion as of June 1993.20 The net income
produced since the Fund's inception now exceeds $10 billion,
including $1.2 billion of investment earnings produced during the
1993 fiscal year.2" Alaskans have received nearly $3.5 billion in
dividend distributions. '
12. Id. § 1(c).
13. Id. § 1(d).
14. Id. §§ 2(a), 3.
15. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
16. Id. at 65.
17. ALASKA STAT., TEMPORARY AND SPECIAL ACrS AND REsoLvEs 276-77
(1982).
18. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8) (Supp. 1992). In addition to the residency
requirement being struck down by the United States Supreme Court, there were
problems with fraudulent and duplicate applications, garnishment requirements
and establishing the legal existence of minors. Domestic News: Checks, Reuters,
Oct. 16, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
19. KNAP, ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
20. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 3, at 4.
21. Id.
22. John Enders, Alaskan Oil Fund Still Gushes Billions Long After
Acrimonious Court Battle, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, at B5.
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Ironically, however, as the fund grows, Alaska's fiscal problems
worsen. Oil revenues supply eighty-five percent of the State's
general revenues and thirty percent of residents' personal in-
come.' Oil revenues are dropping, however, and the State is
currently having difficulty funding education and other programs. 24
While revenue from the Permanent Fund could be channeled to
State services,' such a move is likely a political impossibility, as
any mention of tapping dividend money results in public uproar.26
Yet, if the legislature can restructure the fund so that disburse-
ments are tax-free, nearly $100 million can be redirected away from
the IRS to the State's coffers each year.27 This result will be both
fiscally sound and politically feasible.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAXATION OF DIVIDEND
PAYMENTS
A. The Position of the IRS: Private Letter Ruling 81-21-122 and
Revenue Ruling 85-39
After the enactment of the Permanent Fund Dividend
Program, the Alaska Department of Revenue sought advice from
the IRS concerning the tax treatment of the dividends. In a 1981
private letter ruling,' the IRS informed the State that the divi-
dends were not gifts and were taxable as income.29
The IRS later issued a revenue ruling3 which stated that
monies received by Alaskans from the dividend program would be
taxed as income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code
23. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1.
24. See Hal Spencer, It's Bonus Checks Inviolate, Alaska Nears a Crisis, N.Y.
TIMEs, March 28, 1988, at A19.
25. One rationale for creating the Fund was to ensure that the State could
maintain basic services once revenues from current oil production became
insufficient to support existing programs. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1, 3.
Phasing out dividends by itself will not sufficiently meet the State's future fiscal
needs. The State must also continue to cut spending; expand the economy and tax
base by fostering development; reimpose the state personal income tax; and
conserve windfalls, which include budget reserves, anticipated settlement payments
and any unexpected revenues. Id. at 6-7.
26. Id. at 6-7.
27. The average tax rate of 20%, see supra note 4, applied to the amount of
dividend payments, which is anticipated to be over $500 million in fiscal 1994,
ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CoRP., supra note 3, at 4, results in federal tax
payments of over $100 million.
28. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-21-122 (Feb. 27, 1981).
29. Id.
30. Rev. Rul. 85-39, 1985-1 C.B. 21.
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("IRC").3x The ruling held that the payments were not gifts
because the stated purpose of the program was to provide an
incentive to residents to continue uninterrupted residence in the
state.3" The IRS further held that the program was distinguishable
from general welfare program payments33 because the bonus was
payable to state residents regardless of financial means, health,
educational background or employment status 4 Consequently,
when the State began mailing dividend checks, a statement was
attached informing residents that the dividend amount must be
reported as taxable federal income.35
B. Greisen v. United States: Permanent Fund Dividend Payments
are Taxable
In Beattie v. United States,36 Alaskan taxpayers challenged the
assessment of federal income tax on the Permanent Fund dividend
payments. The district court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the payments were "income"
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and section 61 of
the IRC.37 The court also held that the payments were not gifts
and thus not excludable from gross income under section 102(a) of
the Code.38 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Beattie decision in
Greisen v. United States.39
1. The dividend payments constitute income under section
61(a) of the IRC. The Greisen court first addressed the question
of whether the dividend payments constituted income under the
Sixteenth Amendment and section 61 of the IRC.41 The appellant
taxpayers asserted that the applicable definition of income was the
31. Id.
32. Id. at 22.
33. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
34. Rev. Rul. 85-39, at 22.
35. Beattie v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Alaska 1986), affd sub
nom. Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1006 (1988).
36. 635 F. Supp. 481 (D. Alaska 1986). Beattie was a consolidation of three
suits, two of which were brought by the Beattie children by and through their
father. The third was brought by David Greisen, by and through his father. Id.
at 484-85. The latter's name attached to the case when it was appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.
37. Id. at 492.
38. Id.
39. 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988). The
Greisen court's decision rested on different grounds than those offered by the
lower court in Beattie. See infra note 61 and text accompanying notes 62-66.
40. Greisen, 831 F.2d at 918.
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common definition at the time of the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment: "a 'coming in' of wealth from a source exterior to
the taxpayer.",41 The appellants argued that the Permanent Fund
dividends do not come from an outside source because they are
derived from Alaska's natural resources, which are already owned
by state citizens.42 The court rejected this assertion, and noted
that even if the people do own the state's natural resources (and
therefore the principal of the Fund), the dividend payments are
derived from interest on that principal and thus come from an
external source." Thus, the court held that the payments consti-
tuted income under the appellant taxpayers' definition.'
Though the court used the appellant taxpayers' definition of
income, its holding is applicable even under the modern definition
of income, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.4 -"undeniable accessions
to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion."' Undoubtedly, the dividends are accessions
to wealth, and, as cash payments, immediately realized and
controlled by the taxpayer. Thus, even under the Glenshaw Glass
standard, the dividend payments are income under the Sixteenth
Amendment.
2. The dividend payments fail to qualify for the general welfare
payment exclusion from gross income. Consequently, the payments
are taxable unless they fall within the IRC's explicit exclusions
47
or qualify as "general welfare payments." Many types of govern-
mental disbursements "made 'in the interest of the general
41. Id. (quoting Beattie, 635 F. Supp. at 491).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
46. Id. at 431. Although the IRC nowhere defines the term "income," a broad,
expansive definition of income has evolved under case law. In Glenshaw Glass,
the Supreme Court replaced the then-obsolete definition of income found in
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). The issue faced by the Court in
Glenshaw Glass was whether punitive damages awarded in private antitrust actions
were taxable. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431-33. Instead of reconciling these
windfalls with Macomber's definition of income as "'the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined,"' i& at 430 (quoting Macomber, 252 U.S. at
207), the Court limited the Macomber holding to its facts, stating that it was "not
meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions," iL at 431.
In its place, the Court set forth what is today the accepted definition of income.
See BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, & GIFTS 5-1, at 5-11 n.32 (1989).
47. See I.R.C. §§ 101-137 (1992).
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welfare"' are excluded from gross income, such as disaster relief
and aid to low-income families and the elderly and disabled. 8
Although there is no clear common law origin for this doctrine, the
IRS has consistently held that payments made pursuant to
legislation adopting social benefit programs are not included in
gross income.49 To qualify as a general welfare program, however,
payments must be based on the recipient's health, education,
financial status or employment status.50 Because the Permanent
Fund dividend payments are available to all residents of Alaska
who apply regardless of their individual characteristics, the distribu-
tions fail to meet this requirement.
3. The payments do not qualify as gifts under section 102 of
the IRC. Although the Permanent Fund dividend payments are
income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, they are
nonetheless excludable from gross income, and thus not taxable, if
they qualify as gifts under section 102(a) of the IRC. Section
48. BORIS I. BITrKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 8.12, at 8-25 (1988) (quoting Rev. Rul. 76-144,1976-
1 C.B. 17). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 20. These disbursements
include payments under state laws for the relief of needy persons, Rev. Rul. 57-
102, 1957-1 C.B. 26; benefits under the child care food program, Rev. Rul. 79-142,
1979-1 C.B. 58, modified by Rev. Rul. 84-61, 1984-1 C.B. 39-40; disaster relief
payments, 42 U.S.C. § 5178 (1988); Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17; and other
welfare and government benefits. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17
(Payments by the federal government to victims of major disasters are not taxable,
since they are "from a general welfare fund in the interest of the general
welfare."); Rev. Rul. 73-87,1973-1 C.B. 39 (Payments under federally funded anti-
poverty program are not taxable.).
49. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-205,1974-1 C.B. 20 (Replacement housing payments
received under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 are not
includable in gross income.). A possible rationale for excluding general welfare
transfers from gross income is that these payments are unique in that they are
applied directly to established needs. To tax these payments would contradict the
redistributive goals of these programs, as well as the redistributive design of the
income tax system. Despite the absence of a stated rationale, a clear doctrine has
materialized whereby payments under social benefit programs are excludable from
gross income even though they are not statutorily exempt. See Ricketts v. United
States, 405 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (rejecting taxpayer's claim that
military retirement bonus was excluded from gross income because it was not a
payment made for the general welfare, such as social security payments, which
were fully excludable at that date).
50. See Rev. Rul. 76-131, 1976-1 C.B. 16 (Payments under the Alaska
Longevity Bonus Act based on residency and age, without regard to that person's
health, education, financial status or employment status, are not general welfare
payments.).
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102(a) provides that "[g]ross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."51
As neither Congress nor the Treasury has ever promulgated an
authoritative definition of the term "gift" as used in section 102(a),
the task of defining the term has been left to the courts.52 In
Commissioner v. Duberstein,53 the Supreme Court defined a gift
as a transfer that proceeds from a "'detached and disinterested
generosity"'' " and arises "'out of affection, respect, admiration,
charity or like impulses."'"5  "'[W]hat controls,"' the court ex-
plained, "'is the intention with which payment, however voluntary,
has been made."'
56
Disbursements from government entities to individual citizens,
as is the case with the Alaska dividend, are conceptually difficult
to place within the Duberstein definition, since governments
generally do not proceed out of a detached and disinterested
generosity. Rather, political, sociological and constitutional
considerations factor into government transfers. Still, courts have
held that a government can make a "gift." In Dewling v. United
51. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1992).
52. BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 46, at 10-4.
53. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
54. Id. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956))
(emphasis added).
55. Id. (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952))
(emphasis added).
56. Id. at 285-86 (quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 45 (1937)).
The Duberstein court then applied the above principles to the two companion
cases under review. In Duberstein itself, the Court reinstated the trial court's
conclusion that a Cadillac automobile received by the taxpayer from a business-
man to whom he had given the names of potential customers was not a tax-free
gift. Id. at 291-92. The Court held that the trial court was warranted in finding
that the transfer was a recompense for the taxpayer's past services or an
inducement for him to be of further service, and therefore did not proceed from
a detached and disinterested generosity. Id. In the companion case (Stanton v.
United States), the Court had more difficulty in addressing the transfer to a church
employee of a $20,000 "gratuity" upon his resignation to enter business for
himself. The trial court held that the transfer was a gift, but the court of appeals
reversed, noting that there was "no evidence that personal affection ...
[motivated] the payment." Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir.
1959), vacated and remanded, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The Supreme Court remanded
the case for further findings because it was not clear whether the trial court had
applied the proper legal standard to the facts. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 292-93. On
remand, the district court made detailed findings of fact and again concluded that
the payment was a gift, and its judgment was affirmed on appeal. Stanton v.
United States, 186 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 287 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1961).
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States, 7 the Court of Claims found that annuity payments from
the federal government, made in recognition of past service in the
construction of the Panama Canal, were "gifts" and were not to be
included in the taxpayer's income. 8 Similarly, in United States v.
Hurst,59 a district court found that a gift had been made when the
discoverer of mineral deposits was rewarded with a land grant.'
The IRS has also recognized that a transfer made by a government
may qualify as a gift.'
When this issue came before the Ninth Circuit in Greisen v.
United States,62 the court noted that the Duberstein standard63
was sufficient for analyzing transfers made by government enti-
ties.' In applying Duberstein, the court held that the dividends
were not gifts because the legislature lacked the requisite donative
intent.65 The court reasoned that the dividends were paid out of
a sense of moral or legal duty and that the legislature intended the
dividends to benefit the state economically, as indicated by the
preamble and statement of purpose of the 1980 Act that created
the dividend program.'
57. 101 F. Supp. 892 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
58. Id. at 893-94.
59. 2 F.2d 73 (D. Wyo. 1924).
60. Id.
61. Rev. Rul. 57-233, 1957-1 C.B. 60 (Payments to American Indians for
relocation and vocational training are gifts under section 102(a) because the
federal government receives no consideration for such grants and the Indians incur
no obligations.); Rev. Rul. 55-609, 1955-2 C.B. 34 (Death gratuity payments out
of Congress's contingency fund are gifts.).
Despite this precedent, when this issue came before the Alaska District Court
in Beattie v. United States, see supra text accompanying notes 36-38, the court
concluded that "a public transfer of money by act of a state legislature in
furtherance of a public purpose is sui generis-that is, in a class by itself, [and]...
is simply not a gift." Beattie v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 481, 489 (D. Alaska
1986), affd sub nom. Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988). The court distinguished the Dewling and Hurst
precedents on the ground that they involved gifts from Congress rather than the
state legislature. See id. at 490.
62. 831 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
63. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
64. Greisen, 831 F.2d at 919 n.5. The court refused to adopt the quid pro quo
analysis used in evaluating gratuitous transfers for charitable purposes under IRC
§ 170, stating that no precedent required them to adopt that test and that they
were not prepared to make such a sweeping change in the law. Id. For a
discussion of the quid pro quo standard, see infra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text.
65. Greisen, 831 F.2d at 920.
66. Id. at 919-20.
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The court's application of the Duberstein standard was sound.
The language from the preamble and statement of purpose of the
1980 Act do indicate a lack of donative intent on the part of the
legislature. In the preamble, the legislature stated that it was acting
because of a "duty" regarding Alaska's natural resources.
According to Duberstein, "if the payment proceeds primarily from
'the constraining force of any moral or legal duty,' ... it is not a
gift. 
6 8
The objectives of the 1980 Act also indicate that the legislature
anticipated an economic benefit from the dividend program, which,
according to the Duberstein standard, removes the transfer from
gift status. Section 1(e) of the Act characterized Alaska's high rate
of population turnover as "a serious problem," leading "to political,
economic, and social instability."69 Alaska lawmakers therefore
hoped that the dividend program would benefit the state economi-
cally by encouraging people to remain in Alaska. The Act's third
purpose, increased involvement by residents in the management
and expenditure of the Permanent Fund,"0 also indicates that the
legislature anticipated a benefit from the transfer.
That these benefits are arguably illusory is irrelevant, for under
the Duberstein standard, only the transferor's intent controls.71
The Ninth Circuit adhered to this principle in Olk v. United
States.72 In Olk, the taxpayer was a dealer in Las Vegas casinos
and received "tokes" from gamblers, who hoped that such
payments would bring them good luck. When the IRS tried to tax
these tips as income, the taxpayer argued that the payments did not
involve any real benefit and were therefore excludable as gifts.73
However, because the gamblers believed that the tokes would bring
them some benefit, the court rejected this argument.74 Similarly,
the Alaska legislature's belief that the state would receive benefits
from the dividend payments denies the disbursements gift status.
67. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 1(a), 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 ("It is the
duty and policy of the state with respect to the natural resources belonging to it
and the income derived from those natural resources to provide for their use,
development, and conservation for the maximum benefit of the people of the
state.").
68. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Bogardus
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)).
69. 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws § 1(e).
70. Id § 1(b)(3).
71. See supra text accompanying note 56.
72. 536 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
73. Id. at 878.
74. Id. at 879.
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4. The payments were motivated by substantial benefits and
thus fail even the proposed quid pro quo standard. The taxpayers
in Greisen also asserted that their case was distinguishable from
Duberstein, which involved interpersonal transfers, because
payments from the Fund came from the government. Since such
transfers are generally not motivated by affection and admiration,
factors on which the Duberstein court focused, the appellants
argued that the Duberstein analysis should not control.75 Rather,
they asserted that the court should supplement the Duberstein
analysis with the more specific standard developed by the Court of
Claims for analyzing gifts made for charitable purposes under
section 170 of the IRC. 6
Although courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have used the
Duberstein standard to define charitable gifts under section 170,'
the Court of Claims has offered a more specific standard for
assessing their taxability. In Singer Co. v. United States,78 the
Court of Claims had to determine whether the distribution of
sewing machines to schools and various charities qualified as a gift
made for charitable purposes. Opting for a standard that focused
directly on the specific and unusual type of relationship involved in
the case, the court stated:
It is our opinion that if the benefits received, or expected to be
received, are substantial, and meaning by that, benefits greater
than those that inure to the general public from transfers for
charitable purposes (which benefits are merely incidental to the
transfer), then in such case we feel the transferor has received,
or expects to receive, a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the
transfer from the realm of deductibility under section 170.7,
The court stressed that incidental benefits resulting from charitable
giving do not invalidate the deduction; "[i]t is only when the
75. Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916, 919 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
76. Id. The court refused, stating that "[n]o precedent requires us to employ"
any standard other than Duberstein. Id.
77. See Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1976); DeJong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962); Transamerica Corp. v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 504, 514 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968);
Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620, 624 (1971).
78. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
79. Id. at 423 (emphasis added). The specific Singer standard is simply a
refinement of the more general Duberstein test of detached and disinterested
generosity. If a transferor makes a transfer and receives, or expects to receive, a
quid pro quo involving substantial benefits, then the transferor's intention is not
one of detached and disinterested generosity. The Singer standard merely assists
in the analysis of unusual fact situations, such as the present one.
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benefits derived are substantial enough to provide a quid pro quo
for the transfer that the deduction is not allowed."80
The IRS has expressly relied upon Singer, paraphrasing the
quid pro quo standard in revenue rulings."' The IRS also applied
the exchange concept of the quid pro quo doctrine in holding that
government transfer payments to groups of American Indians for
relocation and vocational training were gifts under section 102(a)
of the Code.' In light of these revenue rulings, the taxpayers in
Greisen argued that this quid pro quo standard should apply to
disbursements made under the dividend program.
Although the dividend program is more similar to the large
distribution made by the Singer Corporation than to the typical
business situations that inspired the general Duberstein standard,
the transfers of payments from the Permanent Fund still fail to
qualify as gifts even under the quid pro quo standard. The three
purposes expressed by the State in the 1980 Act' indicate that the
State anticipated substantial benefits through Permanent Fund
distributions, benefits which negate the possibility of the payments
being considered gifts.
Although the Act's first purpose, the equitable distribution of
a portion of the state's energy wealth, anticipates no substantial
benefit as a quid pro quo from the program, the second purpose,
encouraging population stability, does. The legislature explicitly
stated that Alaska had a "serious problem of population turn-
over."'  By adopting the dividend program, the State hoped to
improve its economic and political situation, thereby receiving a
substantial benefit. The State also anticipated the benefit of
"increased awareness and involvement by the residents" in the
management of the Permanent Fund.' By giving the populace a
vested interest in the Permanent Fund, Governor Hammond and
the legislature tried to create a motivated citizenry that would help
regulate legislative spending. 6
These perceived benefits led the Alaska Supreme Court to find
that the purposes of the dividend program were legitimate goals
under the Alaska Constitution,' which requires that any appropri-
80. Id.
81. Rev. Rul. 80-286,1980-2 C.B. 179-80; Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1 C.B. 60-61.
82. Rev. Rul. 57-233, 1957-1 C.B. 60-61.
83. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 1(b), 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 1. See supra
text accompanying note 11.
84. 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws § 1(e).
85. Id. § 1(b)(3).
86. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 4, at 11-5.
87. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 464 (Alaska 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 55
(1982).
1994]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
ation be made for a public purpose.' The anticipated benefits
that fueled the enactment of the 1980 Act, therefore, preclude the
categorization of the dividend payments as gifts even under the
more expansive Singer test.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND PAYMENTS
This analysis suggests at least four possible approaches to
restructuring the existing program to provide for non-taxable
disbursements from the Permanent Fund. 9 Three of these
proposals either fail to make the payments non-taxable or do not
further the original purposes of the dividend program. But the
fourth proposal discussed here, a fossil fuel rebate program, may
succeed in avoiding the taxation of dividend payments while
promoting the main purposes of the original disbursement program.
A. Proposal 1: Redraft the Statute to Clarify the Legislature's
Donative Purpose
The Greisen decision to tax Permanent Fund distributions
focused on two of the stated goals underlying the 1980 Act:
reducing population turnover and increasing the economic and
political stability of Alaska.' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
these anticipated benefits indicated that the transfer program did
not arise out of a detached and disinterested generosity.91 But the
Act's third purpose, to distribute Alaska's energy wealth to the
citizenry, was not addressed by the court, and may satisfy the
Duberstein standard. 2 The legislature could redraft the Act to
make clear that its motivation is a disinterested generosity in
distributing the state's energy wealth to its owners-the people of
Alaska-and thereby demonstrate that the "dominant purpose" of
the dividend program is donative. Thus, under the Duberstein
standard, which focuses on the intent of the donor, the disburse-
ments would arguably qualify as gifts.
It is doubtful, however, that a redrafted version of the statute
would be sufficient to establish the donative intent necessary for
exclusion under section 102(a) of the IRC. As the Supreme Court
88. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6.
89. As one goal of this note is to stimulate discussion among the Alaska legal
community, the author welcomes any other suggestions for restructuring the
dividend program.
90. Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916,920 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988).
91. Id.
92. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 1(b)(1), 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 1.
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stated in Duberstein, "the donor's characterization of his action is
not determinative .... [T]here must be an objective inquiry as to
whether what is called a gift amounts to it in reality."'  Further-
more, it is well established that legislative intent alone does not
govern federal tax consequences.94 The IRS could likely establish
that the initial goals of the Act were still in place, and that donative
intent was not the "dominant purpose."95 As the payments would
remain taxable under this proposal, it fails to provide an adequate
solution.
B. Proposal 2: Channel the Revenue from the Dividend Program
into State "General Welfare" Programs
A second possible solution is to dedicate revenue from the
dividend program to State social benefit programs whose distribu-
tions qualify for tax exemption under the "general welfare"
doctrine. 6 The earnings from the Permanent Fund could then be
distributed tax-free through State programs that are now feeling the
squeeze of Alaska's fiscal crisis. According to the recent fiscal
strategy paper of the Institute of Social and Economic Research
(University of Alaska, Anchorage), it is crucial that Alaska develo
a plan to phase out the Permanent Fund Dividend Program.
The strategy paper argues that Alaska should use the earnings to
help pay for basic services-one of the original rationales for
creating the Fund.98 This proposal completely eliminates the
dividend program, however, and is antithetical to one of its stated
purposes. That purpose is to give Alaskans a more direct stake in
budget decisions in order to counteract "the perceived inequity in
the distribution of other State benefits." 99
The enactment of the Permanent Fund followed a pattern of
legislative mismanagement of windfall revenues that the State
received after the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay Oil Field. In 1969,
the State received $900 million in bonus payments for petroleum
leases on state land, an amount eight times more than its annual
93. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 178, 286 (1960) (citing Bogardus v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 40 (1937)).
94. See, e.g., Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938), overruled on other grounds
by Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Rev. Rul. 79-180, 1979-1 C.B. 95.
95. See Sharaf v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1955) (The Commission-
er's determination of deficiency is presumed to be correct, and taxpayer has the
burden of proof in overcoming this presumption.).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
97. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 10.
98. Id.
99. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 4, at 11-3 to 1-4.
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budget at that time."° The legislature spent the entire amount in
less than four years.10' By 1974, the $900 million was gone, and
"many Alaskans felt that the [money] had been poorly spent."'"
One of the reasons for giving each resident a share in the
dividend program was to create an incentive for Alaskans to
"defend the fund against possible raids by legislators and bureau-
crats who would rather spend the money" than save for Alaska's
future.0 3 This purpose has been achieved: Alaskans are fervent-
ly antagonistic to even the slightest mention of tampering with the
Fund."°4 In this atmosphere it is doubtful that Alaskans would
allow the legislature to abruptly halt their dividends to provide for
general social benefits programs in the absence of any direct
personal benefit to themselves. While it may be fiscally sound to
use dividend funds for basic services, it appears that such a drastic
proposal is currently a political impossibility.
C. Proposal 3: Enact a "Cafeteria Style" Social Welfare Benefits
Dividend Program
An alternative to halting dividend payments outright and
channelling the funds into basic services would be to provide
eligible residents with the option of receiving disbursements either
through tax-free State social benefit programs or through the
existing taxable dividend format. On the annual application for
dividend payments, a resident could choose to waive his dividend
payment and apply to receive payments from the State under a
social benefit program or programs. The application would contain
a menu of benefit programs under which payments would arguably
be excludable from income. The menu could include options such
as home heating fuel rebates, 05 property tax and rent re-
funds," scholarships for college tuition" and child care and
food subsidies."3  This proposal would enable residents to apply
100. Id. at I-1.
101. Id. at II-1 to IH-2.
102. Id. at H1-2.
103. Enders, supra note 22, at B5.
104. Spencer, supra note 24, at A19.
105. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-170, 1978-1 C.B. 24 (State-financed credits against
winter energy bills of elderly low income individuals are not taxable.).
106. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-86, 1970-1 C.B. 23 (allowing exclusion from gross
income of homeowners' property tax rebates and renters' rebates under § 111 of
the IRC); Rev. Rul. 78-194, 1978-1 C.B. 24.
107. I.R.C. § 117 (1992) (Scholarships are not taxable if they meet certain
criteria.).
108. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-142, 1979-1 C.B. 58 (Payments to day care home
operator by charitable organization under Child Care Food Program are
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for those programs for which they are eligible and which they most
need, and the options would be as expansive as possible to
maximize the number of residents who could benefit.' °9  To
maintain equity among those residents who opt for the existing
taxable dividend format, the amount receivable under these
programs could be limited to the after-tax value of the annual
dividend payment. The flexibility of this approach may make this
program politically feasible.
Under current law, however, payments under this program
would probably be taxable under the constructive receipt doctrine,
which prevents a taxpayer from "turn[ing] his back upon income"
in order to avoid tax liability."0 The IRS has applied this doc-
trine in the analogous situation of employer fringe benefits offered
through non-qualified cafeteria plans."' In that context, the
Service has ruled that an employee who may choose between non-
taxable and taxable benefits must include in gross income the
amount of the taxable benefits that the employee could have
elected to receive."12 The IRS, therefore, will likely treat a
taxpayer's choice of non-taxable benefits in lieu of cash under the
proposed cafeteria style dividend program as a constructive receipt
of taxable income-that is, as if the taxpayer had taken the cash
and used it to purchase the benefits he actually received.
excludable to the extent they compensate expenses incurred in feeding children
eligible for assistance.).
109. Additionally, the data collected from people applying for the benefit
programs would provide information about what type of programs the people of
Alaska most need and would help fund those social programs that are currently
being strangled by Alaska's fiscal crisis. Most importantly, this program would
demonstrate to Alaskans that there is a cost to providing State programs and
services. See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 12.
110. See Hamilton Nat'l Bank of Chattanooga v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 63,
67 (1933) (citations omitted). The income tax regulations provide that cash,
property or services are taxable to cash-basis taxpayers when "actually or
constructively received." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1987).
111. Code section 125(a) provides that no amount is includable in gross income
of a participant in a cafeteria plan solely because the participant may choose
among the benefits of the plan. I.R.C. § 125(a) (1992). However, this exception
is statutorily expressed for qualified plans and does not trump the common law
constructive receipt doctrine when the benefits are offered through unqualified
programs. To qualify, a plan must meet the statutory requirements, and the
benefits must be statutorily non-taxable. These benefits include group term life
insurance, accident and health insurance, dependent care benefits and some
qualifying deferred compensation arrangements. See BITrKER & MCMAHON,
supra note 48, at 8-20.
112. See I.R.C. § 125(a) (1992); BrrrKER & McMAHON, supra note 48, at 8-20.
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D. Proposal 4: Restructure the Dividend Program to Provide a
Rebate for Fossil Fuel Expenditures and Qualified Scholarship
and Tuition Payments
The last suggested approach is to use proceeds from the
Permanent Fund to provide non-taxable rebates for personal fossil
fuel expenditures. Since such expenditures are non-deductible,
these rebates would not be taxable under the tax benefit princi-
ple.' Additionally, by providing rebates to offset the rising cost
of home heating and transportation, the State would satisfy one of
the original purposes of the Permanent Fund Dividend Program.
In the 1980 Act, the legislature found that "state residents have
been paying increasingly high prices for fossil fuels, while few have
received direct monetary benefits from the production and
development of fossil fuels belonging to them as Alaskans," and
stated that it intended to return to the residents of Alaska "a
portion of the state's income from oil.., production to help offset
rising fuel costs.""' 4
The residents of Alaska deserve a respite from spiraling fuel
costs since they have to bear the externalities associated with oil
exploration and production. Alaskans have to live with the
environmental hazards of oil spills and pipeline ruptures, as well
as the economic risks of the volatile oil market. The rebate
program would thus serve an equitable purpose by compensating
Alaskans for the personal costs imposed by these externalities. All
residents could qualify for this program by demonstrating, in an
annual rebate application, a certain level of annual expenditures in
home heating oil and automobile fuel.
Although most minors would not have incurred the necessary
fuel expenses to qualify for a rebate, disbursements to minors could
be maintained through a scholarship program. The IRC excludes
from gross income "qualified scholarships" received by any
individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution with a regular faculty and student body."5 These
scholarships would not have to be based on need, so all minors
113. For a discussion of the tax benefit rule, see infra notes 120-122 and
accompanying text.
114. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 1(d), 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 2.
115. I.R.C. §§ 117, 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1992). A scholarship is qualified if used
for tuition and related expenses by a student who is a candidate for a college
degree or in a program of training to prepare students for gainful employment in
a recognized occupation. IL § 117(b)(1); BTrKER & MCMAHON, supra note 48,
at 5-25.
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could receive disbursements upon matriculating at a qualified
institution. 6
While the above rebate and scholarship disbursements pro-
grams would not provide the flexibility of the cafeteria style plan,
they would focus on needs shared by nearly all Alaskans. Most
Alaskans have substantial home heating and automobile fuel costs
which have been compounded by a recent sharp increase in
gasoline taxes."7 Recent statistics indicate that each Alaskan
household spends, on the average, approximately $1472 per year on
fossil fuels, compared to a nation-wide average of only $1068."'
Most residents could therefore easily demonstrate that they have
extensive fuel expenses from home heating and automobiles. And,
in order to prevent waste, the rebate could be tied to a maximum
consumption level. The advantage of the rebate program is that it
would provide tax-free payments while furthering an expressed
purpose of the current dividend program, returning a portion of
State revenues from oil production to residents to offset rising fuel
costs.119
The disbursements under this program would be excludable
from gross income because the payments would reimburse personal
expenditures that were not used to justify a deduction or another
form of tax benefit. Normally, when a taxpayer recovers an item
the tax benefit rule is activated, requiring a taxpayer to include the
item in income if the taxpayer obtained a prior deduction or credit
attributable to it." However, if there was no prior tax allow-
ance, a recovery need not be included in income: the tax benefit
rule "does not embrace the recovery of items that did not give rise
to tax allowances when paid or incurred, such as the refund of an
amount paid for personal goods or services or a non-deductible
116. The State could provide scholarships for residents who attend colleges or
vocational institutes in Alaska and thus subsidize Alaska residents' efforts to
obtain additional education.
117. In 1992 the State increased its gasoline taxes, moving from the lowest tax
rate in the country to the nation's average. Yereth Rosen, Alaskans Reluctantly
Face Drop in Oil Boom, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 22, 1992, at U.S. 9.
118. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATE ENERGY PRICE AND EXPENDITURE
REPORT 1990, Sept. 1992, at 21,27. See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS
OF HOUSING: GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, UNITED STATES 1; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS OF HOUSING: GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTER-
ISTIcs, ALASKA 1. These statistics were derived as follows: the total energy
expenses incurred by the entire residential sector in the United States and Alaska
were divided by the number of residences in the United States and Alaska.
119. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 1(d), 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 2.
120. I.R.C. § 111 (1992). Under the tax benefit rule, refunds of non-deductible
amounts are not includable in gross income and thus are not taxed. See Clark v.
Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939).
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tax."'' The rule is one "'of inclusion and exclusion: recovery of
an item previously deducted must be included in income; that
portion of the recovery not resulting in a prior tax benefit is
excluded.""'
The expenses that the rebate program would relieve are non-
deductible personal expenses which do not result in a tax benefit;
therefore, they should not be included in income under the tax
benefit rule. Personal fuel expenses are not deductible under
section 262(a) of the IRC, which denies deductions for personal,
living or family expenses."z Gasoline taxes are not deductible
because they are not specifically included under section 164(a) as
deductible state and local taxes." The net effect of the rebate
program, therefore, would be equivalent to a situation in which the
taxpayer never incurred the expense. Thus, the rebates would not
cause an increase in the taxpayer's net worth and would not be
taxable.'2'
The fact that the rebates do not come from the same party to
whom the taxpayer's original payment was made is irrelevant. In
Clark v. Commissioner,26 the Board of Tax Appeals held that
under the tax benefit rule, the taxpayer did not receive income
121. Boris I. Bittker & Stephen B. Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L.
Ruv. 265, 274 (1978) (emphasis added); see also Rev. Rul. 78-194, 1978-1 C.B. 24
(Property tax rebate was not includable in taxpayer's gross income because the
rebate was in the nature of a return of rent, a previously non-deductible item.).
The same principle has been applied to the recovery of an amount which was not
deductible when paid because the taxpayer was an exempt organization at the
time. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235,239
(Ct. Cl. 1962).
122. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 121, at 271 (quoting Putoma Corp. v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 664 n.10 (1976)).
123. I.R.C. § 262(a) (1992).
124. Id. § 164(a).
125. This offsetting of expenses is similar to the non-taxable imputed income
that an individual earns when he mows his lawn, paints his own house or performs
his own domestic services. See BrITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 46, at 5-22.
Congress has chosen not to tax this source of economic gain because in theory,
there is no reason to distinguish between individuals who perform self-help and
those for whom an hour of leisure is worth more than a neatly trimmed lawn or
a freshly cleaned house. Id. at 5-24. Rigorous consistency in the treatment of
imputed income would require taxing leisure as well as unpaid services rendered
by taxpayers to themselves. Similarly, taxing the recoupment of expenses would
require taxing those who did not incur expenses due to their personal choices. To
tax individuals who receive a reduction in their expenses would be to punish their
initiative in pursuing activities that require the incurment of expenses, similar to
the punishment of the individual who performs self-help.
126. 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939).
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from a payment from his accountant for a tax return error even
though the payment came from a source other than the one to
whom it was originally paid.27 Similarly, the IRS has allowed
exclusions from gross income for homeowners' property tax rebates
and renters' rebates, even though such rebates came from the State
rather than the local entity that collected the real property
taxes.12
The IRS might challenge the exclusion of these payments on
the ground that every resident would still be entitled to roughly the
same payment, regardless of individual need. However, rebates
would be contingent on individual demonstrations of expenditures
by each applicant and would therefore be distinguishable from the
current dividend program. The proposed rebate program should
likely withstand an IRS challenge, thereby providing tax-free
payments from the Permanent Dividend Fund.29
The fuel assistance rebate program would be politically feasible
because it allows for widespread payments that would appear
equitable to Alaskans. The program also would help to address
Alaska's pending fiscal crisis. Dr. Scott Goldsmith, professor of
economics at the Institute of Social and Economic Research
(University of Alaska, Anchorage), believes that the two primary
criteria of a successful restructuring of the dividend program are
making the payments non-taxable and encouraging fiscal responsi-
bility through increased citizen awareness of the cost of social
programs ° A fuel assistance rebate program would meet both
of these goals. First, payments from the program would not be
taxable by the federal government, thus preventing the leakage of
close to $100 million annually. Second, since the program would
provide payments linked to tangible needs, Alaskans would better
understand that social programs have a cost and that the State can
no longer afford to distribute funds if a need has not been shown.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems surrounding the taxation of the Alaska Perma-
nent Fund dividend payments are complex. The Ninth Circuit
correctly decided in Greisen that the payments are income and do
127. Id. at 335.
128. Rev. Rul. 70-86, 1970-1 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 78-194, 1978-1 C.B. 24.
129. To prevent uncertainty as to the taxation of these rebate programs, the
state legislature should pursue an advance ruling from the IRS. Although the IRS
does not appear to have any direct policy against issuing rulings in this area, such
a ruling may be difficult to obtain due to the large amount of revenue at stake.
See generally Rev. Proc. 93-1, 1993-1 I.R.B. 10-49.
130. Telephone Interview with Scott Goldsmith, Professor of Economics,
Institute of Social and Economic Research (Nov. 15, 1992).
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not qualify for statutory exclusion as general welfare payments or
as gifts under section 102(a) of the IRC. Therefore, the only
feasible alternative to continued taxation of the payments and the
resulting leakage of approximately $100 million annually in federal
income taxes is to restructure the existing program.
By restructuring the program to create a fossil fuel rebate
program, tax-free payments could be made from Permanent Fund
earnings. With its focus on common needs, this program would
retain a broad base of recipients and would therefore be politically
viable. Additionally, the rebate program would meet all three
purposes of the original dividend program: encouraging the
retention of a high level of interest in the management of the
Permanent Fund; providing for the equitable distribution of a
portion of the state's energy wealth; and encouraging residential
longevity in Alaska. Finally, by tying the payments to well-
established needs, the restructured program would encourage fiscal
responsibility by demonstrating that State benefit programs have
tangible costs and that the State can no longer afford its current
level of spending.
Laurence S. Smith
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